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LEGISLATION




During the 1976 and 1977 legislative sessions, the Maryland
Legislature enacted significant and comprehensive legislation which
codified Maryland law on rape and other sexual offenses.1 The
Legislative Council's Special Committee on Rape and Related
Offenses 2 held numerous meetings and public hearings prior to the
1976 legislative session.3 Based on the Special Committee's findings,
legislation was proposed, amended and adopted in the 1976 session
as the first phase of reform and codification of Maryland sexual
offense law.
The 1976 phase of the legislature's work dealt with the
substantive law and rules of evidence for these crimes. The 1976
statutes divided rape into two degrees 4 and delineated, in separate
sections, four degrees of "sexual offenses." 5 In addition, the
legislation changed the sub-title of the subject code sections from
"Rape" to "Sexual Offenses". 6 Treating all sexual offenses on a
gender-neutral basis, the new laws recognized women as possible
offenders against men, men against men, women against women, as
well as men against women. Finally, the new laws banned, outright,
reputation evidence of the victim's chastity.7 The statute dictated
that the court hold a prior in camera hearing to determine whether
particular evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is admissible.8
To be admissible, such evidence must fall within four enumerated
categories. 9
1. Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 573, 1976 Md. Laws 1528; Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 574,
1976 Md. Laws 1541; Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 Md. Laws 1976; Law of
May 17, 1977, ch. 292, 1977 Md. Laws 1985; Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 293, 1977
Md. Laws 1988; Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 294, 1977 Md. Laws 1990; Law of May
17, 197, ch. 336, 1977 Md. Laws 2076.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Special Committee."
3. The following persons or groups gave testimony before the Special Committee:
state prosecutors, defense attorneys, legislators, educators, The Maryland
Commission on the Status of Women, The National Organization of Women, The
Governor's Commission to Study Implementation of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, The Women's Law Center, jurors, civic groups, rape victims and their
parents, and representatives of rape crisis centers. The Committee was chaired
by Senate President Steny H. Hoyer.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 462-463 (Supp. 1976).
5. Id. §§ 464-464C.
6. Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 573, 1976 Md. Laws 1528.
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1976).
8. Id.
9. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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The second phase of reform took place during the 1977 session of
the legislature. One bill was passed correcting sexual offense
nomenclature throughout the Maryland Code, consistent with the
1976 changes. 10 Other bills addressed the administrative and
procedural problems involved with handling and treating victims of
rape and related sexual offenses.11
This article will examine Maryland's new sexual offense
legislation and analyze the changes in Maryland criminal law and
procedure.
II. MARYLAND COMMON LAW AND EARLIER STATUTORY
PROVISIONS ON RAPE
Prior to the 1976 session of the Maryland Legislature, the
Maryland rape statute was primarily a sentencing law, fixing the
penalties without actually defining the crime. 12 Therefore, in order to
discern what constituted the crime of rape, an examination of the
common law was necessary. As is the case in many areas of the
common law, courts differed upon the essential elements of the
crime, and in how they were to be proved.
Common law rape was often defined as "the act of a man having
unlawful carnal knowledge of a female over the age of ten years by
force without the consent and against the will of the Victim."
13
However, other courts have defined the crime in more general terms
as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent.
'1 4
Other typically required elements for common law rape were force,
15
absence of the victim's consent, 16 and penetration. 7 Proof of
emission was not essential."
10. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 Md. Laws 1976. The bill, S.B. 937, redefined
pertinent crimes, penalties, and language to comport with the 1976 changes in
the law of sexual offenses.
11. Id. ch. 293 at 1988.
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461 (1951). (The statute states that "penetration shall
be evidence of rape," yet fails to set forth the other elements required for
conviction).
13. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 468, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960); Coward v. State, 10 Md.
App. 127, 130, 268 A.2d 508, 509 (1970); Scott v. State, 2 Md. App. 709, 711, 237
A.2d 61, 62 (1968).
14. Frank v. State, 6 Md. App. 332, 337, 251 A.2d 249, 252 (1969); Scott v. State, 2 Md.
App. 709, 711, 237 A.2d 61, 62 (1968) (holding that carnal knowledge and sexual
intercourse, are synonymous, both meaning actual contact of sexual organs of a
man and woman and actual penetration).
15. See Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960); State v. Merchant,
10 Md. App. 545, 556, 271 A.2d 752, 758 (1970).
16. Id.
17. Edmondson v. State, 230 Md. 66, 67, 185 A.2d 497 (1962); Smith v. State, 224 Md.
509, 511, 168 A.2d 356, 357 (1961); Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 163, 151 A.2d 737,
739 (1959); Craig v. State, 214 Md. 546, 547, 136 A.2d 243, 244 (1957); McEntire v.
State, 2 Md. App. 449, 452, 235 A.2d 311, 313 (1967).
18. Scott v. State, 2 Md. App. 709, 715, 237 A.2d 61, 65 (1968) (proof of emission was
also specifically not required by statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461 (1951)).
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Force need not have amounted to physical violence; under the
common law definition of "force", serious threats to the victim's
safety would suffice. 19 In the face of such force, submission to an act
of sexual intercourse was not considered to be equivalent to
consent. 20 In practice, however, courts frequently required that the
woman "resisted to the extent of her ability," 2' a requirement which
effectively placed the onus of proving resistance on the victim.
Under Maryland common law, once a defendant asserted
consent as a defense in a rape case, the general character or
reputation (as distinguished from specific acts) of the prosecuting
witness for chastity was admissible in evidence. 22 According to the
courts, this type of evidence was thought to be of probative value in
determining whether the act was committed with or without the
victim's consent.23 The victim's difficulty of proof, however, was
somewhat diminished by the evidentiary rule that the testimony of
the prosecuting witness needed no corroboration.
24
The statutory rape provisions contained in the pre-1976
Maryland Code made it a felony for anyone to "carnally know and
abuse any woman child under the age of fourteen years, or
knowingly carnally know and abuse any woman who is an imbecile,
non compos mentis or insane, of any age whatever. '25 It was only a
misdemeanor for any female over the age of eighteen years to
carnally know a male, not her husband, under the age of fourteen
years. 26 The carnal knowledge of any female between the ages of
fourteen and sixteen years, not the perpetrator's wife, was likewise
considered a misdemeanor in the pre-1976 Code.
27
19. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960); Burnette v. State, 15
Md. App. 371, 376, 290 A.2d 816, 819 (1972); State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545,
556, 271 A.2d 752, 758 (1970).
20. Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 381, 183 A.2d 359, 364 (1962); Hazel v. State, 221 Md.
464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960); State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 556, 271
A.2d 752, 758,(1970).
21. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960); See generally CLARK &
MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 11.01 (7th ed. 1967).
22. Caldwell v. State, 276 Md. 612, 614-18, 349 A.2d 623, 625-27 (1976); Johnson v.
State, 232 Md. 199, 207, 192 A.2d 506, 510 (1963); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 381,
183 A.2d 359, 364 (1962); State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 214, 344 A.2d 446,
448 (1975).
23. See Smallwood v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 205 F. Supp. 325, 329-30 (D. Md.
1962) (withholding chastity evidence which might have affected outcome of trial
is prejudicial error on part of State's Attorney); England v. State, 21 Md. App.
412, 421, 320 A.2d 66, 72 (1974) (citing Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 121-22,
175 A.2d 777, 780 (1961)); See generally J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (3rd ed. 1940).
24. Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80, 220 A.2d 131, 135 (1966); Domneys v. State, 229
Md. 388, 391, 182 A.2d 880, 881 (1962); Leek v. State, 229 Md. 526, 528, 184 A.2d
808, 809 (1962); Doyal v. State, 226 Md. 31, 34, 171 A.2d 470, 471 (1961). But see
Johnson v. State, 3 Md. App. 219, 222, 238 A.2d 295, 296 (1968) (holding
corroboration not required unless testimony of prosecutrix is internally
inconsistent in relation to pertinent issues).
25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1951).
26. Id. § 462A.
27. Id. § 464.
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III. PROBLEMS IN THE PRE-1976 LAW
The rape laws in effect at the beginning of 1976 created many
problems for victims and offenders alike. A major problem
confronting the rape reform advocates was that common law rape
punished only men engaging in unlawful vaginal intercourse with
women, and did not punish forcible anal or oral sexual acts
committed against males or females. Even though all forcible anal
and oral acts could be prosecuted, respectively, under the Sodomy or
the Perverted Practices sections of the Code, 28 the maximum penalty
for either sodomy or perverted practices was limited to ten years, 29
whereas common law rape could result in a sentence of life
imprisonment. 30 Thus, crimes of equal force were assigned disparate
punishments. Recognizing that most people regard forcible sex of
any description as equally odious, a state commission studying
Maryland rape law recommended equal sanctions for all forcible
sexual acts.
31
The rigidity of the existing law posed additional problems.
Numerous witnesses testified before the Special Committee that the
possibility of a life sentence and the absence of degrees of rape made
many jurors reluctant to vote for a conviction 32 in cases when there
was no physical injury or when the victim might have placed herself
in a vulnerable situation.3 3 On the other hand, when a victim had
suffered injury and numerous sexual indignities that fell short of the
required element of physical penetration, the assailant could only be
punished for simple assault and battery under the older Maryland
law. 34 Assault and battery were also the only charges available to a
husband or wife, no longer domiciled with his or her spouse, but
28. Id. § 553 ("Sodomy"); § 554 ("Perverted Practices").
29. Id.
30. Id. § 461.
31. GOVERNOR'S COMM. TO STUDY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, RAPE LAW REFORM IN MARYLAND (January, 1976) (hereinafter
referred to as RAPE LAW REFORM).
32. FBI crime statistics for 1970 showed that 46% of all rape trials ended in
acquittals or dismissals, as compared to a 29% rate for all crimes. Hearings on
S.B. 358 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., 1976 Legislative Session
(February 18, 1976) (statement of Elaine L. Newman, Maryland Commission on
the Status of Women). In 1974, fifty-seven rapes and rape attempts were reported
in Montgomery County, Maryland, and thirty-four arrests were made. Only
eleven defendants were found guilty of rape and assault with intent to rape.
REPORT OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY SEXUAL OFFENSES COMMITTEE (June
1975). See generally Hearings on S.B. 358 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Comm., 1976 Legislative Session (February 18, 1976) (statement of Ellen Burlow,
President, Montgomery County Commission for Women).
33. See Proposed Reform of the Maryland Laws of Rape and Other Sexual Offenses:
Hearings Before the Special Comm. (July 7, 22, 29, 1975; August 4, 1975;
September 8, 29, 1975; October 20, 1975) (a vulnerable situation was thought to be





forcibly "raped" by that spouse, because Maryland common law did
not define forcible sexual intercourse with one's spouse as a crime.3 5
The existing law also created an inequity which made specific
instances of the victim's past sexual conduct inadmissible into
evidence, unless the conduct was with the defendant, yet which
permitted introduction of a victim's general reputation for chastity if
consent was a defense. As a representative of the Governor's
Commission to Study Implementation of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment stated: "Rape law reformers reject the legal supposition that a
person who has a premarital or extramarital sexual relationship
with one person is likely to consent to sexual relations with each and
every other person who so desires."36 Reformers contended that since
the law held that a victim's reputation for chastity was relevant,
many victims chose not to report and prosecute rape, rather than
subject their past sex lives to embarrassing and degrading scrutiny
and exposure in open court.
3 7
The sentencing provisions of the rape laws produced additional
inequities. For example, under former section 462 a male fourteen
years of age or older was guilty of statutory rape if he had
intercourse with a consenting female less than fourteen years old.38
Because statutory rape carried a life sentence, the defendant was
automatically within the jurisdiction of the adult rather than the
juvenile court, and was treated as an adult charged with a crime
even if he was fourteen and the female was only one day less than
fourteen years of age.39 By contrast, consensual relations between a
male over eighteen and a female between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen became punishable only as a misdemeanor carrying a
maximum two-year sentence. 40 Likewise, forcible or non-forcible
intercourse between a female over the age of eighteen and a male
under fourteen was a misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of no
more than eighteen months imprisonment. 41 Thus, many persons
involved with the criminal justice system contended that the law of
sexual offenses needed overhauling by the legislature.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
In 1975, the Legislative Council of the State Legislature
established the Special Committee on Rape and Related Offenses.
The Special Committee held thirteen public meetings and hearings
35. Scott v. State, 2 Md. App. 709, 711, 237 A.2d 61, 62 (1968).
36. RAPE LAW REFORM at 2.
37. Id.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1951). It was generally presumed at common law
that a male under fourteen years old was a physical imbecile and therefore
impotent. Waters v. State, 2 Md. App. 216, 226, 234 A.2d 147, 153 (1967).
39. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-804(d)(1) (Supp. 1976).




through the summer, fall and winter of 1975, and received testimony
from all interested groups. 42 At the conclusion of the testimony from
those persons seeking reform of the sexual offense laws, as well as
those opposed to change, the Special Committee drafted legislation
which proposed comprehensive revision of Maryland's law relating
to rape and other sexual offenses. The final amended versions of
some of these bills became the nucleus around which Maryland's
new sexual offense law grew.
V. 1976 CHANGES - PHASE ONE
Briefly stated, the 1976 laws present six possible sexual offenses:
first and second degree rape, first and second degree sexual offenses
(involving "sexual acts"), and third and fourth degree sexual
offenses (involving "sexual contact"). Section 461 defines terms such
as "mentally defective," "mentally incapacitated," "physically
helpless," "sexual act," "sexual contact," and "vaginal inter-
course."
43
Section 461A, entitled "Admissibility of evidence in rape cases,"
bans direct and opinion evidence relating to a victim's reputation for
chastity from any prosecution for the commission of a rape.44 On the
other hand, the section does allow evidence of specific instances of
the victim's prior sexual conduct, but only if the judge in a prior in
camera hearing finds that the evidence is relevant and material to a
fact in issue and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value. 45 If those conditions are met, four types
of evidence may be admissible: 1) evidence of the victim's past
sexual conduct with the defendant; 2) evidence of specific instances
of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy,
disease, or trauma; 3) evidence which supports a claim that the
victum has an ulterior motive in accusing the defendant of the crime;
or 4) evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment when the
prosecutor puts the victum's prior sexual conduct in issue.
46
The list of exceptions to the ban on evidence of specific instances
of the victim's prior sexual activities was, in reality, a codification of
the common law, and thus constituted no substantive change. 47 The
outright ban on reputation evidence and the in-chambers balancing
of prejudicial value against probative value, however, marked a
42. See note 2 supra.
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461 (Supp. 1976).
44. Id. § 461A.
45. Id. § 461A(b).
46. Id. § 461A(a)(1)-(4).
47. Cf. MCCORMACK, EVIDENCE, § 44 (2d ed. 1972) (citing 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 924a (Chadbourn rev 1970)) (concerning the views of eminent psychiatrists as




substantive change in Maryland law and, as such, was hotly
debated during hearings before the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee.
In testimony at those hearings, reformers contended that the
banning of reputation evidence pertaining to the victim's chastity
was an overdue measure which was essential to safeguard the
victim's right of privacy. One witness testifying before the Commit-
tee, expressed the sentiment that:
For too long, the victim has been subjected to the
embarrassment and harassment of a defense attorney's
attempt to discredit her charge by questions designed to
show that because she consented to sexual relations in the
past, she must have consented in the situation at issue.
48
In another witness' words, "The suggestiveness of such testimony,
both by devious inference and by intonation, can be very destructive
and insidious, and the inferences invited by such suggestiveness
must surely make an impact on the jury." 49 Proponents of the
legislation universally agreed that as a result of the past evidentiary
procedures, the complaining witness experienced subsequent anxiety
and humiliation. These reformers felt that allowing evidence of a
woman's sexual history in the courtroom made it difficult for the
casual observer at a rape trial to determine who was actually being
tried.
Senator Rosalie Abrams made what was perhaps the most
persuasive argument for adoption of the present section 461A, in
stating that the issue of chastity is not even relevant:
There is no reason to believe that a woman who engages
in sexual acts voluntarily thereby implicitly consents to any
and all. Nor is there any reason to believe that that which
passes as a person's "reputation for chastity" has any
bearing on the person's consent to a specific act.50
Senator Abrams concluded that the proposed legislation, banning
such evidence, would adequately limit admissible evidence to those
facts which would demonstrably bear on the specific act in
question.5 1
48. Hearings on S.B. 358 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., 1976
Legislative Session (February 18, 1976) (statement of Carolyn Feinglass, Task
Force to Study the Treatment of Victims of Sexual Assault, National
Organization for Women).
49. Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the Special Comm. (July 22,
1975) (statement of Naomi Mestanas, Rape Sub-Committee, Maryland Commis-
sion on the Status of Women).
50. Hearings on S.B. 358 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., 1976





As a consequence of the pre-1976 evidentiary rules, the general
concensus among persons testifying before the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee was that a high percentage of rapes went
unreported due to the fact that many victims preferred not to bare
their past sexual lives before the community under the open court
questioning of defense attorneys. 52 Those who testified urged that
something be done about curing this intolerable situation.
The proposed remedy, however, raised the countervailing
consideration of a defendant's constitutional right to present
relevant evidence on his behalf. In testimony before the Special
Committee, a representative of the Maryland Chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union voiced concern over possible
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 53 by proposed
section 461A. 51 Maintaining that the right of the defendant to a day
in court requires paramount protection, the witness averred that the
effect of limiting the scope of the defendant's opportunity to examine
what is usually the only material witness against him would "create
inflexibility and straightjacket a defendant's rights."
55
A memorandum by the Certiorari Review and Law Development
Section of the Maryland Public Defender's Office likewise questioned
the constitutionality of a ban on reputation evidence. 56 In support of
its contention that the proposed legislation "could conflict with the
constitutional right of a defendant to confront his accusers," 57 the
Public Defender's Office cited the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals' decision in State v. DeLawder,58 which relied on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska.
59
52. Id. (statement of Anne Arundel County Commission on the Status of Women;
statement Theodore G. Venetoulis, County Executive of Baltimore County;
statement of Elaine Newman, Executive Director of Maryland Commission on
the Status of Women); see Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the
Special Comm., (September 8, 1975) (statement of Mary Ann Willin, Esq.,
Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, that in Baltimore City during
1975, of the 900 rape victims treated at Mercy and University Hospitals, only 480
were reported to police). The Women's Crisis Hotline at the University of
Maryland, College Park Campus, had reports of 79 rapes during 1975, yet
campus police only received 4 reports, Hearings on S.B. 358 Before the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Comm., 1976 Legislative Session (February 18, 1976)
(statement of Susan Zevgolis, Director of Women's Affairs at the University of
Maryland, College Park Campus).
53. MD. CONST., DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 23. See also MD. CONST., DEC. OF RIGHTS, art.
21.
54. Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the Special Comm., (September
29, 1975) (statement of Elsbeth Bothe, Esq., Maryland Chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union).
55. Id.
56. Memorandum from Certiorari Review and Law Development Section, Office of
the Public Defender of Maryland (Legislative Session, 1976) (hereinafter referred
to as Public Defender's Memorandum).
57. Id. at 3.
58. State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
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The DeLawder decision, reversing a trial court's refusal to let
defense counsel cross-examine the prosecutrix in a rape case about
her statements to other persons that she was pregnant, held as
follows:
[I]n the light of Davis,... defense counsel should have been
permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors,
as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. By
being prevented from so doing DeLawder was denied the
right of effective cross-examination, a constitutional error of
the first magnitude which no amount of showing of want of
prejudice would cure.6°
The court concluded that the desirability of the prosecutrix to be able
"to testify free from embarrassment and with her reputation
unblemished," is subordinate to "the right of an accused to seek out
the truth in the process of defending himself."
61
While recognizing that the proposed legislation allowed admis-
sion of the type of evidence which was excluded by the trial court in
DeLawder, the memorandum stated that the DeLawder argument
might successfully be used to challenge the total exclusion of
evidence of the reputation for chastity of the rape victim.
62
Apparently the legislators did not agree with the strong constitu-
tional attack framed by critics of the new legislation; the bill was
favorably reported and passed.63
VI. THE TWO DEGREES OF RAPE
Section 462, entitled first degree rape, codified the common law
definition of rape in non-gender specific terms. 64 The distinguishing
feature of first degree rape is the inclusion of a set of aggravating
circumstances. The first such circumstance includes the use or
display by the offender of a dangerous or deadly weapon, or an
article which the victim might reasonably conclude to be such a
weapon.65 A second aggravating element would be the offender's
infliction of suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, or serious
physical injury upon the victim or anyone else in the course of
committing the crime.66 If the offender threatens or places the victim
59. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
60. State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 227-28, 344 A.2d 446, 455 (1975).
61. Id.
62. Public Defender's Memorandum, supra note 56, at 4.
63. SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., 1976 LEGISLATIVE SESS., REPORT ON
S.B. 399. The legislation which was eventually passed by both houses was the
House version contained in H.B. 715, to which the Public Defender's Memoran-
dum was addressed.
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (Supp. 1976).
65. Id. § 462(a)(1).
66. Id. § 462(a)(2).
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in fear that the victim or other persons known to the victim "will be
imminently subjected to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigure-
ment, serious physical injury, or kidnapping," the third aggravating
element exists. 67 The fourth aggravating element consists of the
offender committing the offense aided and abetted by one or more
persons. 68 Anyone convicted of a first degree rape offense is subject
to life imprisonment.
69
Second degree rape, section 463, penalizes forcible vaginal
intercourse with another person, or with a person whom the rapist
"knows or should reasonably know" to be "mentally defective,
mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless," but absent the
aggravating elements of the first degree offense. 70 The maximum
penalty for conviction of second degree rape is twenty years
imprisonment.
7 1
VII. THE FOUR DEGREES OF SEXUAL OFFENSE
First degree sexual offense, covered by section 464, consists of a
"sexual act" with another person by force or threat of force, against
the will and without the consent of the other person, in conjunction
with any of the enumerated aggravating circumstances of first
degree rape.72 Section 461 defines a "sexual act" as either cunnilin-
gus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but expressly excludes
vaginal intercourse. 73 The definition further states:
Sexual act also means the penetration, however slight, by
any object into the genital or anal opening of another
person's body if the penetration can be reasonably construed
as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification
or for abuse of either party and if the penetration is not for
accepted medical purposes.
74
Included in the section is the offense of a consensual sexual act with
a person under fourteen years of age if the offender is more than four
years older.7 5 The maximum penalty for conviction of a first degree
sexual offense is imprisonment for life.
76
Second degree sexual offenses are enumerated in section 464A.
This section parallels the section on second degree rape to the extent
of the force involved in the offense. It should be noted, however, that
67. Id. § 462(a)(3).
68. Id. § 462(a)(4).
69. Id. § 462(b).
70. Id. § 463.
71. Id. § 463(b).
72. Id. § 464.
73. Id. § 461(e).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 464(a)(2).
76. Id. § 464(b).
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"sexual act" is substituted for "vaginal intercourse," 77 and further,
that section 464A contains the additional subsection which makes
the forcible sexual act with a person under fifteen years of age a
second degree sexual offense if the offender is four or more years
older than the victim. 78 The maximum penalty for violation of the
section is twenty years imprisonment.
79
Section 464B, which sets forth the elements of third degree
sexual offense, states that a person is guilty of a sexual offense in
the third degree if he or she engages in sexual contact against the
will and without the consent of another person, and the act is
aggravated by one of the four circumstances set out in first degree
rape and first degree sexual offense.8 0 Where the aggravating
circumstances are lacking, the offender violates the section if he or
she knows or should reasonably know that the victim is mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, or where
the victim is under fourteen years of age and the offender is four or
more years older.8' "Sexual contact" is defined in section 461 as:
the intentional touching of any part of the victim's or actor's
anal or genital areas or other intimate parts for the purposes
of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party
and includes the penetration, however slight, by any part of
a person's body, other than the penis, mouth, or tongue, into
the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that
penetration can be reasonably construed as being for the
purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for the abuse of
either party. It does not include acts commonly expressive of
familial or friendly affection, or acts for accepted medical
purposes.8 2
The penalty for conviction of third degree sexual offense is
imprisonment for a period of not more than ten years.
8 3
Section 464C, entitled fourth degree sexual offense, penalizes
sexual contact with another person against the will and without the
consent of that other person.8 4 Additionally proscribed by the section
is a sexual act with another person who is fifteen years old when the
offender is four or more years older than the victim, or vaginal
intercourse with another person fourteen or fifteen years old when
the offender is fouror more years older than the victim. 8 5 The
77. Id. § 464A(a).
78. Id. § 464A(a)(3).




83. Id. § 464(b).
84. Id. §464C.
85. Id. § 464C(a)(2), (3).
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penalty of violation of section 464C is imprisonment for a period of
not more than one year, a fine of not more than $1000, or both fine
and imprisonment.
8 6
Finally, section 464D addresses itself to a sexual offense or rape
against a person who is the offender's spouse.8 7 It mandates that a
person may not be prosecuted under section 462, 463, 464B, or 464C88
if "the victim is the person's legal spouse at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense unless the parties
are living separate and apart pursuant to a decree of divorce a
mensa et thoro."8 9
VIII. 1977 LEGISLATION PASSED - PHASE TWO
In addition to enacting a bill redefining certain crimes to include
rape or sexual offenses in any degree, and correcting nomenclature
pursuant to the 1976 changes, 9° the 1977 legislature continued in the
spirit of reform with important changes in the laws of sexual
offense. House Bill 1445 expanded Article 27, section 461A to exclude
evidence of reputation for chastity in cases of second degree rape
and first and second degree sexual offenses. 91 Senate Bill 658 added
section 461B to Article 27, establishing a general indictment or
warrant for all rape and sexual offense cases. 92 Senate Bill 934 was
passed, downgrading statutory rape of a person under age fourteen
by a person at least four years older than the victim, from the first to
the second degree.
93
In the realm of administrative changes, House Bill 1984 stated
that victims of rape and sexual offenses may not be charged for the
cost of related examinations by a physician or hospital. 94 Further,
the bill provided that hospitals and doctors be reimbursed by the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and that the rights of
the victims who are insured be subrogated to the Department.95
Finally, a bill was passed authorizing the Police Training Commis-
sion to require that the curriculum and course of study for police
training include courses concerning the crimes of rape and sexual
offenses.
96
86. Id. § 464C(b).
87. Id. § 464D.
88. Id. (the section does not specifically bar prosecution under 464, first degree
sexual offense, and §464A, second degree sexual offense. These offenses are
generally included in the still existing Sodomy and Perverted Practices sections,
§§ 553 and 554, respectively).
89. Id.
90. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 Md. Laws 1976.
91. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 294, 1977 Md. Laws 1990.
92. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 336, 1977 Md. Laws 2076. Previously, indictment was
generally covered by Md. Rule 703, as defined in sec. (a) of Rule 702.
93. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 292, 1977 Md. Laws 1985.
94. Law of May 24, 1977, ch. 854, 1977 Md. Laws 3320.
95. Id.




The basic goals of the comprehensive legislation during both
phases of legislative reform were threefold. The first goal was to
redefine the stigmatizing sexual crimes that existed in Maryland in
non-gender specific terms which were less likely to cause additional
psychic trauma to the victim. 97 The second goal sought to preclude
the admission into evidence of certain testimony as to the chastity of
the victim and to limit admission of evidence of specific instances of
the victim's prior sexual conduct, thereby lessening the likelihood of
exacerbating the psychological injury already suffered. Finally, the
legislature attempted to provide viable criminal sanctions for those
transgressors falling within the gap which formerly existed between
the common law misdemeanor of assault and the felony of rape
which was punishable by life imprisonment.98
The first goal was sufficiently accomplished without any real
cause for dissent. As previously discussed, the second goal was met
by the enactment of section 461A, over the objections of those who
thought the measure too heavily weighted toward the prosecution
and in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Whether
section 461A will stand the constitutional test that it is bound to be
subjected to in the courts remains to be seen. 99
Concerning the third goal, that of codifying the elements and
penalties of rape and other sexual offenses into degrees, the Special
Committee has performed its task admirably and efficiently.
Inconsistencies remain, however, which will be illustrated below.
One underlying consideration for the codification movement was
what most concerned groups regarded as a conviction rate for rape
which was dismally low when compared to conviction rates for other
97. Hearings on S.B. 358 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., 1976
Legislative Session (February 18, 1976) (statement of Elaine Newman, Maryland
Commission on the Status of Women, wherein she expressed the sentiment that
the old historical view of rape no longer prevailed, and therefore, that the
nomenclature of the law should reflect that change. She further stated that
because of the historical connotations of rape, the victim felt defiled, degraded,
and of less value, and that many women refused to report a rape because they
could not even bring themselves to say the word).
98. See generally Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the Special Comm.
(June 24, 1975).
99. See, for an analysis of the constitutional arguments of both sides of the issue:
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape
Victim and the Court, 58 JUD. 391 (1975); Davis, Character Evidence in Rape
Cases, 1976 N.Z.L.J. 178; Herman, What's Wrong With Rape Reform Laws?, 3
Civ. LIB. REV. 60 (1976); Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional
Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, Limitations on the Right
to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining
Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflections of Reality or Denial of Due
Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403 (1975); 15 DUQ. L. REV. 155 (1976).
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violent crimes. 100 These groups felt that the penalties for certain sex
offenses should be changed or reduced because the life imprisonment
penalty for rape was a roadblock to convictions.10 1 They contended
that, pragmatically, there already existed degrees of rape, running
the gamut from brutal ravishment and murder to what has
euphemistically been referred to as the "date rape." 10 2 According to
these organizations, the failure of the law to recognize the
gradations of severity among crimes all termed "rape" has
encouraged many juries to refuse to convict when life imprisonment
appeared to be an overly harsh penalty.
The new laws apparently were designed to meet what many felt.
to be an urgent need for re-examination of the one-category method
of dealing with the crime of rape. If one follows this reasoning, then
certain flaws in the present legislation become apparent. If the new
laws are designed to set out smaller penalties for lesser degrees of
violent offenses and thus promote greater incidence of convictions
by giving the jury the option of a more equitable punishment for the
crime, then why is the only alternative maximum penalty twenty
years imprisonment? Some observers would argue that such a
penalty for the crime of second degree rape is still too severe. Juries
may persist in their refusal to convict certain rape offenders, even in
the second degree, if the victim is not seriously injured or was in a
so-called "vulnerable" situation. So, while the new law may bring
about a greater rate of convictions, the legislature might do well to
consider continuing study of the issue of further gradations of
punishment for different degrees of rape. An examination of recently
enacted legislation concerning sexual offenses in other states would
prove helpful to legislators seeking an example of more rational
penalties.
Some jurisdictions have approached the sentencing problem by
entirely eliminating the possibility of life imprisonment for a rape
offender, 10 3 or by greatly reducing the sentence for an offense
committed without actual intent of infliction of bodily harm. 04 In
Michigan, under a statutory scheme similar to Maryland's, 10 5
100. Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the Special Comm. (September 24,
1975) (testimony of various State's Attorneys on the conviction rates in their
respective jurisdictions).
101. See Hearings on Rape and Related Offenses Before the Special Comm. (August 4,
1975) (statement of Professor John M. Brumbaugh, Reporter, Maryland
Commission on Criminal Law).
102. SENATE JUD. PROC. COMM., 1976 Legislative Session, REPORT ON S.B. 358
(stating "this latter term referring to a situation wherein, more often then not,
parties are acquainted (albeit shortly) and the aggressor is numbed by alcohol,
sexually aggressive and likely to misinterpret the fearful cries of the victim").
103. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., tit. 53a, §§ 70-73a (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT.,
§§ 163.305 to 163.465 (1973).
104. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE, § 264 (Supp. 1976) (proivdes a sentence of no greater
than five years for sexual crimes without intent or actual infliction of harm).
105. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(2)-(5) (1977).
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criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is punishable by life
imprisonment. Unlike Maryland, Michigan expressly provides the
alternative sentence of "any number of years."' 1 6 This alternative
not only makes allowances for situations in which the difference in
age between the offender and the victim is very small, but it serves
to lessen the chance that a jury will refuse to convict a rape
defendant simply because the punishment is severe. In a similar
vein, New York sets minimum and maximum determinate sentences
for its three degrees of rape, 10 7 while allowing the court the flexibility
of imposing sentencing alternatives for crimes in the second and
third degree which take into account whether the person is a first-
time or a recidivist offender.
0 8
Maryland's new laws still mete out disproportionate penalties
for some crimes of nearly the same severity. Under section 463(a)(3),
vaginal intercourse with a person under fourteen years of age, if the
actor is at least four years older than the victim, is a second degree
rape offense punishable by a possible twenty years imprisonment. 109
The same act with a fourteen year old is only a fourth degree offense,
a misdemeanor subject to not more than one year imprisonment
and/or a fine of not more than $1000.110 Thus the law creates a
potential disparity in punishment of up to twenty years for a
difference in the victim's age of as little as one day.
A similar disparity can be found in section 464B(a)(3), where the
line is drawn at age fourteen for an act of consensual sexual
contact.1" The possible penalty for committing this felony with a
victim who is thirteen and a half years of age is ten years imprison-
ment. The same act committed against a "victim" of fourteen years
of age or older is not even made a crime under Maryland statute.
These inequities merely serve to point out the difficulty of
drawing a statutory line at certain ages in order to delineate
different acts for which society feels punishment is warranted. This
difficulty should not prevent the legislature in future sessions from
re-examining those specific instances where disparate punishment is
provided for sexual offenses of almost equal magnitude. Further
consideration should also be given the problems which might arise
as a result of the new statutory incorporation of most, but not all, of
the acts from the Sodomy and Perverted Practices sections into the
present sexual offense laws. This situation will undoubtedly create
confusion for prosecutors and defendants, in that those specific acts
106. Id. § 28.788(2). While Maryland courts may choose to impose less than the
maximum sentence for a given degree of sexual offense, no alternative sentences
are expressly provided by statute.
107. N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 70.00(2)(a)-(e), (3) (1973).
108. Id. § 70.00(4), § 70.06.
109. Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 292, 1977 Md. Laws 1985.
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §464C (Supp. 1976).
111. Id. § 464B(a)(3).
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are still in effect under the old Sodomy ' 12 and Perverted Practices
sections.' 13 The legislature might want to examine the Oregon
statute in this regard because of its treatment of parallel degrees for
rape and sodomy offenses." 4 Such a solution may help to alleviate
the political resistance by those opposed to repeal of Sodomy and
Perverted Practices sections.
While the above flaws in the statute do exist, it was inevitable
that a codification process embodying the elements of political and
sociological considerations, taking place during the hectic pace of a
90-day legislative session, would be less than ideal. The recent
legislative initiatives by Maryland in reforming the law of sexual
offenses wisely recognize that society has a duty to impose
punishments on sexual offenders of both sexes which correspond to
the violence of their acts and the effects upon their victims. Such an
approach best serves to protect not only the rights of the victim, but
those of the aggressor as well.
J. William Pitcher
ADDENDUM
On January 30, 1978, the Maryland Senate passed on third
reader an amendment to Section 461C of Article 27. The bill, which
as of early February was before the Maryland House Judiciary
Committee, prohibits the judge in a rape or sexual offense trial from
issuing particular types of jury instructions. If the amendment
becomes law, a jury may not be:
(1) instructed, solely because of the nature of the charge, to
examine with caution the testimony of the prosecuting
witness;
(2) instructed, solely because of the nature of the charge that
the charge is easily made or difficult to disprove; or
(3) given any similar instruction solely because of the nature
of the charge.
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §553 (1951).
113. Id. §554.









FIRST DEGREE RAPE, I
Art. 27. 4 462 I
By force or threat of force against the
will and without the consent of
the victim.
AND EITHER I OR II OR III OR IV
I. Employs or displays a dangerous
or deadly weapon or article.
II. Inflicts suffocation, strangula-
tion, or serious physical injury,
upon the victim or another person
in the course of committing the
crime.
III. Threatens or places in fear the
victim, or another person known
to the victim, of imminent death,
kidnapping, or Serious physical
injury.
IV. Person committing the crime is
aided or abetted by one or more
persons.
I SECOND DEGREE RAPE,
Art. 27, § 463
By force or threat of force against the
will and without the consent of
the victim.
Victim is mentally defective, mentally
incapacited, or physically help-
less; AND defendant knows or
should know this fact.
Victim under 14 and person perform-
ing the act is 4 yrs. or more older
than victim (with or without the
consent of the victim).
FELONY: 20 years maximum.
FELONY: Life imprisonment
maximum.
DEFINITIONS OF CHART TERMS
MENTALLY DEFECTIVE - permanent - victim suffers from a mental disorder, such
as retardation.
MENTALLY INCAPACITATED - temporary - due to drugs or alcohol, victim suffers
from a mental deficiency.
PHYSICALLY HELPLESS - victim is unconscious, asleep, physically handicapped or
physically unable to resist.
115. The following charts and definitions are based on those contained in a document
entitled NEW RAPE AND SEXUAL OFFENSE LEGISLATION, prepared by The
Honorable Steny H. Hoyer, President, Maryland Senate, The Honorable Sandra
O'Connor, State's Attorney for Baltimore County, and The Honorable Edwin





Cunnilingus, Fellatio, Analingus, Anal
Intercourse or the insertion of any
object into the vagina or anus.
FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE I
Art. 27, § 464I
# By force or threat of force against thewill and without the consent of
the victim.
AND EITHER I OR II OR III OR IV
I. Employs or displays a dangerous
or deadly weapon or article.
II. Inflicts suffocation, strangula-
tion, or serious physical injury,
upon the victim or another person
in the course of committing the
crime.
III. Threatens or places in fear the
victim, or another person known
to the victim, of imminent death,
kidnapping, or serious physical
injury.
IV. Person committing the crime is
aided or abetted by one or more
persons.
#2 Victim under 14 and person perform-
ing the act is 4 yrs. or more older
than victim (with or without the
consent of the victim).
FELONY: Life Imprisonment
maximum
SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE
Art. 27, § 464A
#1 By force or threat of force against the
B will and without the consent of
the victim.
o-R
Victim is mentally defective, mentally
#2 incapacited, or physically help-
less; AND defendant knows or
should know this fact.
Victim under 14 and person perform-#3 ing the act is 4 yrs. or more older
than victim (with or without the
consent of the victim).





Intentional touching anal, genital or other
intimate areas (breasts) for sexual purposes,
or insertion of finger or other body part except
penis, mouth or tongue into anal or vaginal area.
THIRD DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE I
Art. 27, § 464B
#1 Against the will and without consent
of the victim.
AND EITHER I OR II OR III OR IV
I. Employs or displays a dangerous
or deadly weapon or article.
II. Inflicts suffocation, strangula-
tion, or serious physical injury,
upon the victim or another person
in the course of committing the
crime.
III. Threatens or places in fear the
victim, or another person known
to the victim, of imminent death,
kidnapping, or serious physical
injury.
IV. Person committing the crime is
aided or abetted by one or more
persons.
[ORI
#2 Victim is metally defective, mentallyincapicated or physically helpless
and the defendant knows or
should know this fact.
4ORI
Victim is under 14 and person per-
#3 forming the sexual contact is four
(4) or more years older than the
victim.
FELONY: 10 Years maximum
FOURTH DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE
. Art. 27 § 464C
#1Against the will and without consent
of the victim.
In Sexual Act with victim 15 years old
#2 and the person performing the
act is four (4) or more years older
than the victim.
Vaginal intercourse with victim 14 or
#3 15 and the person performing the
act is four (4) or more years older
than the victim (consentual).
MISDEMEANOR: 1 Year and $1,000
fine maximum
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Age Age Sex Act Consent Crime
12 15 Intercourse Yes None
12 16 Intercourse Yes 2 Degree Rape
13 18 Intercourse Yes 2 Degree Rape
14 17 Intercourse Yes None
14 19 Intercourse Yes 4 Degree Sexual Offense
15 19 Intercourse Yes 4 Degree Sexual Offense
13 16 Oral Sex Yes None
13 19 Oral Sex Yes 1 Degree Sexual Offense
14 19 Oral Sex Yes 2 Degree Sexual Offense
15 19 Oral Sex Yes 4 Degree Sexual Offense
